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I. Introduction
Asymmetry of information between issuers, under-
writers, and investors plays a central role in the large
literature on initial public offerings (IPOs) of corpo-
rate securities. Early on, Beatty and Ritter (1986)
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We treat information ac-
quisition by potential in-
vestors in initial public
offerings as endogenous.
With endogenous infor-
mation, the critical ques-
tion is why underwriters
would allow investors to
spend resources acquiring
superior information in-
tended solely to effect a
wealth transfer. We show
that an investment bank-
ing syndicate is an insti-
tutional arrangement de-
signed to avoid such a
transfer. By inviting rival
banks to share in the of-
fering, a managing under-
writer ensures they have
a strong incentive to re-
main ignorant. We char-
acterize the resulting out-
come as one of
symmetric ignorance. The
desire to maintain sym-
metric ignorance is con-
sistent with the observed
passivity of nonmanaging
syndicate participants.
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and Rock (1986) showed that asymmetric information can explain the most
salient feature of IPOs, their systematic underpricing. Subsequent literature
on IPO underpricing shows that it can be used to encourage informed parties
to signal their information to the uninformed, that it can be used by the
uninformed to screen the informed, and that it can be used to encourage the
production of desirable information.1 This literature identifies several insti-
tutional arrangements common to IPOs that reduce the extent of underpricing
necessary to achieve signaling, screening, or the production of information.
Examples of such arrangements include reliance on regulars, stabilization,
syndication, and managing underwriters’ unilateral discretion in making IPO
allocations to intermediaries and investors.2
In virtually all of this literature, underpricing and related arrangements serve
to remedy adverse selection resulting from asymmetric information. In this
article, we take information asymmetry to be a consequence of “excess search”
by aggressive investors, who attempt to capture wealth from others by iden-
tifying and exploiting the errors in pricing that managing underwriters in-
evitably make. We show that underpricing can be used to preclude the in-
formation asymmetry that would otherwise lead to adverse selection. We focus
on a single institutional arrangement, the investment banking syndicate.3 We
argue that information preclusion explains why managing underwriters require
members of the underwriting syndicate to behave passively with respect to
valuing and pricing an issue, engage in “reciprocal participations” with syn-
dicate members across successive IPOs, and maintain stable syndicate mem-
bership over time.4
To show how information asymmetry can be precluded, we consider the
case of an investor who can, at a cost, acquire information about the value
of a new issue. To deter the investor from doing so, the underwriter offers
to sell shares at a discount. The discount is such that the investor is indifferent
between (i) acquiring information at a cost and then using it to “pick and
choose” between over- and underpriced issues and (ii) refraining from ac-
1. See Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989) for
signaling models of underpricing; Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Benveniste and Wilhelm
(1990) for screening models; and Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (2002), Maksimovic and
Pichler (2001), Sherman (2000), and Sherman and Titman (2002) for models in which information
is to be produced.
2. See Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Sherman (2000) for an analysis of regulars; Ben-
vensite, Busaba, and Wilhelm (1996) and Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) for that of stabilization;
Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) and Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) for that of investment banking
syndicates; and Benveniste and Wilhlem (1990) and Sherman (2000) for that of underwriter
discretion.
3. In an earlier version of the article, we also considered regular investors and stabilization.
We argued that these arrangements are consistent with information preclusion.
4. The term “reciprocal participation” appears in the government’s complaint in U.S. v. Morgan
Stanley & Co., et al., 118 F. Supp. 621 (1953), an antitrust case in which the U.S. Department
of Justice sought unsuccessfully to enjoin 17 major bracket banks from monopolizing the in-
vestment banking business through this and other institutional arrangements. It refers to under-
writers’ practice of regularly inviting one another to share in their offerings. See Sec. V for
evidence of passivity, reciprocity, and stability.
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quiring information and “buying blind” in all issues. In equilibrium, the in-
vestor acquires no information and there is no information asymmetry. We
characterize this equilibrium as one of symmetric ignorance.
To analyze the investment banking syndicate, we consider the case of mul-
tiple investors. We note that investment banks are likely to be especially
shrewd investors if left outside the syndicate. By inviting rival banks to share
in the offering subject to syndicate rules and government regulations, the
managing underwriter ensures that they have a strong incentive to remain
ignorant and to avoid spoiling the deal.
Our analysis of IPOs follows general work by Fama and Laffer (1971),
Hirshleifer (1971), and Barzel (1977, 1982), and on the problem of “excess
search” and the role of private institutions in limiting this problem. In Hirsh-
leifer’s terms, “private foreknowledge” is information used to identify pricing
errors after resource allocation is fixed. Because it results in a pure wealth
transfer but is costly to produce, it reduces social surplus. As Fama and Laffer
point out, some of what can be described as “speculation” relies on private
foreknowledge. This may account for the negative connotation sometimes
given to the word “speculator.” As opposed to private foreknowledge, “dis-
covery information” is produced prior to the time that resource allocation is
fixed, and because it positively affects resource allocation, it generally in-
creases social surplus. But even discovery information can be overproduced
because optimal expenditures on discovery information will inevitably be
subject to pricing errors that can be exploited by those who gather superior
information. In cases of both fixed and variable resource allocation, then,
excess search has the potential to occur, and private parties will adopt insti-
tutional arrangements to avoid the associated losses.
We proceed as follows. In Section II, we model the maximization problem
an underwriter faces when hired by an issuer to sell shares to a single investor.
We begin by illustrating a simple benchmark case of “symmetric ignorance,”
in which all parties have identical but imperfect information and the cost of
acquiring further information is prohibitive. We then introduce adverse se-
lection, where only the investor can acquire costly information about the
aftermarket price of the shares.
In Section III, we show that the parties’ joint payoff increases if the investor
can commit to remaining ignorant. Even if this commitment cannot be en-
forced, the underwriter can ensure that the investor remains ignorant by un-
derpricing enough to provide him with a self-enforcing rent.
In Section IV, we extend our model to the case of multiple investors and
provide an explanation for investment banking syndicates. In Section V, we
discuss the available evidence in support of our analysis. A distinctive im-
plication of our analysis is the passive behavior of nonmanaging syndicate
participants, as the managing underwriter seeks to prevent the creation of a
problem of adverse selection. This is in contrast to those authors who view
syndicates as serving to remedy the problem of adverse selection. These
predict that syndicate participants should be active in valuing and pricing the
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issue (Pichler and Wilhelm 2001) and in stabilizing it (Chowdhry and Nanda
1996). The available evidence appears to be consistent with our analysis.
Section VI provides a brief discussion and some concluding remarks. The
problem of excess search no doubt exists to some extent for all securities and,
in fact, for virtually all experience goods. Even in secondary security markets,
where a substantial amount of the information acquired by market participants
is intended to improve resource allocation, we believe that many institutional
arrangements can be partially explained as a response to the problem of excess
search.
We stress that it is not our contention that there is no information revelation
in IPOs. Clearly, this is the purpose of book building.5 Our contention, instead,
is that where information is costly to produce and has no role in guiding
investment decisions, there are benefits to devising arrangements that preclude
the production of information. Thus, there should be in IPOs both information
revelation and information preclusion. The information that is revealed is that
produced at zero or low cost or used to guide investment decisions. The
production of costly information whose sole purpose is to transfer wealth is
precluded. Investment banking syndicates may be one way to do so.
II. The Initial Setting
A. Simple Symmetric Ignorance
An issuer contracts with an underwriter to sell a share issue in an IPO. Without
loss of generality, we normalize the number of shares to one. We initially
assume the underwriter approaches a single investor.6 We assume the issuer
and the underwriter have identical incentives and that all parties are risk
neutral.7
We let x denote the aftermarket value of the issue. We assume x ranges
over the interval . We further assume that is the value of the issue[x , x ] xl h l
if retained by the issuer and normalize to zero without loss of generality.xl
Neither the issuer, the underwriter, nor the investor knows x prior to the
offering, although all of them know the distribution of x and its expec-F (.)
tation .8 We characterize their relationship as one of symmetric ig-˜x{ E[x]
norance. With risk neutrality and symmetric ignorance, the underwriter sells
the entire issue to the investor at a price . On average, the investorsiP { x
receives exactly what he pays for and earns a normal return.
5. For extensive empirical evidence, see, e.g., Hanley (1993), Hanley and Wilhelm (1995),
Cornelli and Goldreich (2001, 2003), and Ljunqvist and Wilhelm (2002).
6. We consider the case of multiple investors in Sec. IV.
7. See Baron (1982) and Baron and Holmstro¨m (1980) for an analysis of the agency problem
between issuer and underwriter.
8. We assume that the cumulative distribution function and probability density functionF (.)
satisfy the monotone hazard property, i.e., is decreasing in x.f (.) 1 F (x) /f (x)
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B. Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection
Suppose the investor can establish an informational advantage by spending c
to learn the exact value of x prior to deciding whether to invest. This infor-
mation provides him with a valuable option because it allows him to “pick
and choose” between overpriced ( ) and underpriced ( ) offerings.x ! P x 1 P
The option to pick and choose creates a problem of adverse selection for the
underwriter, who must now choose the price P to be such that
[ ]( )max 1 F P P.
P
This problem has first-order condition,
[ ]( ) ( )f P P 1 F P p0,
( )1 F P
⇔ Pp . (1)( )f P
Denote the solution to equation (1). The presence of adverse selectionasP
decreases the issuer’s expected proceeds, as the issue remains unsold when
. Formally,asx ! P
siP p x
asP xh
( ) ( )p xf x dx xf x dx 
as0 P
xh
as ( )1 P f x dx
asP
as as[ ]( )p 1 F P P .
III. Precluding Information Acquisition
A. A Commitment to Symmetric Ignorance
The preceding analysis shows that the underwriter’s response to the investor’s
ability to acquire information requires the issuer to forgo the sale of the issue
in the cases . The problem of adverse selection therefore prevents theasx ! P
parties from reaping the gains from trades that would be obtained from such
sale.9 The underwriter can devise a superior arrangement, however, by offering
the investor the right to buy the issue at a discount, provided the investor will
9. This is a variant of Akerlof’s (1970) well-known result.
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commit to doing so in advance.10 The discount provides the investor with the
same expected payoff he would receive, net of c, if he were to acquire in-
formation and pick and choose. The commitment price, , is such thatcmP
cm as[ ]x P p E max x P , 0 c,
cm as[ ]⇔ P p x E max x P , 0 c. (2)
The discount, , is the value of the option to pick andasE max [x P , 0] c
choose, net of search costs. As a result, the investor is indifferent between
(i) committing to buy at and (ii) declining to do so, learning the exactcmP
value of x at cost c, and using his knowledge of x to pick and choose among
offerings.
By precluding the investor from acquiring information, the underwriter
avoids the problem of excess search and adverse selection. This increases the
issuer’s proceeds by ensuring the issue sells when and by avoidingasx ! P
c. Formally,
cm as[ ]P p x E max x P , 0 c
as as as[ ]p x P  P  E max x P , 0 c
as as[ ] [ ]p E max x P , 0 E min x P , 0
as as[ ]P  E max x P , 0 c
as as as as( )p F P E[ x P Fx ! P ] P  c
as as as as[ ][ ]( ) ( )p 1 F P P  F P E xFx ! P c
as as[ ]( )1 1 F P P .
B. A Self-Enforcing Commitment to Symmetric Ignorance
The commitment solution assumes that the investor can costlessly commit to
buying the issue at a price of before spending c to learn the exact valuecmP
of x. But the investor’s commitment is not necessarily credible.11 In particular,
suppose .12 From equation (2), this implies thatcm asP ! P
cm cm[ ]E max x P , 0 c 1 x P . (3)
The right-hand side of this inequality is the investor’s expected payoff from
10. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) show that the under-
writer can correct the information asymmetry by establishing a screening mechanism—book
building—to induce the investor accurately to reveal his knowledge of x. In the context of our
simple model, however, screening can be shown to leave the issuer’s expected proceeds unchanged
at .as as[1 F (P )] P
11. We assume that the underwriter’s commitment to sell at a given price is made credible
by its reputation. See Beatty and Ritter (1986), Booth and Smith (1986), Carter and Manaster
(1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991), Beatty and Welch (1996), Nanda and Yun (1997), Carter,
Dark, and Singh (1998), Cooney et al. (1999), Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), and Logue et al.
(2002) for an analysis of underwriter reputation.
12. This would be the case if , e.g., because in such a case.as cmF (x) ∼ U [0, x ] P p x 1 Ph
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honoring his commitment to buy the issue at the price , that is, buyingcmP
blind. The left-hand side is his expected payoff from spending c to learn x
and reneging on his commitment if , that is, picking and choosing.cmx ! P
The inequality indicates that the investor will prefer to learn the exact value
of x and renege on his commitment if this value is low.
A remedial response by the underwriter is to make the investor’s com-
mitment self-enforcing. This requires the issue price to be such that the in-
equality in equation (3) holds as an equality, making the investor indifferent
between honoring the commitment, on the one hand, and spending c and
reneging on his commitment if x is low, on the other hand. Specifically, we
define the self-enforcing price, , to be such that the investor’s discountseP
equals the expected value of the option to pick and choose net of search costs,
se se[ ]E max x P , 0 cp x P . (4)
Note that becausese cmP ! P
P[ ]( ) ( )  x P f x dx c[E max (x P, 0) c (x P)] 0
p 1 0. (5)
P P
IV. Multiple Investors and Investment Banking Syndicates
We now introduce multiple investors. Consider the case in which there are N
investors who have costs of acquiring information . Assuming…c 1 c 1 1 c1 2 N
the fraction of the firm sold is divided equally among the N investors, and
bearing in mind that the self-enforcing price must be such that all investors,seP
including the investor with lowest information acquisition cost , must becN
precluded from acquiring information, we note that the self-enforcing price
is such that
se sex x P P
E max  , 0 c p  ,  NN N N N 
se se[ ]⇔ E max x P , 0 Nc p x P . (6)N
Using the implicit function theorem, we can show that . ThisseP /Nc 1 0N
suggests that the self-enforcing price is maximized by selling the issue toseP
n investors, where . Should , the remainingˆnp arg max nc n ! N N n
ˆ ˆn n
investors should be prevented from taking part in the offering.
Such prevention may, however, be difficult to achieve. For example, the
investors prevented from taking part in the offering may collude withN n
those taking part to acquire information and share the gains from picking and
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choosing.13 Alternatively, the investors may invest through confidentialN n
nominee accounts. Picking and choosing is profitable when the offer price
has been predicated on a minimum information acquisition cost of , but thecn
information acquisition cost of some investors is smaller than .14cn
Syndication has the desired effect. The managing underwriter precludes
those with low costs of gathering information from participating in the offering
as investors by inducing them to join the syndicate, thereby providing them
with a residual share of profits from a successful offering while subjecting
them to various contractual and regulatory restrictions that encourage passiv-
ity. The managing underwriter constrains the ability of syndicate members to
profit from acquiring information by dictating the prices at which they buy
and sell the shares they have been allocated: syndicate members buy at the
issue price minus the spread; they sell at the issue price.15
Syndicate participants are further constrained in their ability to profit from
acquiring information by the prohibition on price discounting and preselling
imposed by the Securities Act of 1933. Syndicate members may not offer any
price discount other than to securities dealers nor may they agree to sell the
shares they have been allocated until the official offering date. Prior to passage
of the act, rival banks apparently used discounting and preselling to “poach”
one another’s investors (Mahoney 2001).16 In the context of our analysis, both
practices would have increased the value from acquiring information. It is no
surprise that established banking houses, whose reputations relied most heavily
on survival of the syndicate system, lobbied successfully to have these prac-
tices prohibited with passage of the act and through subsequent regulation.
This begs the question of why, or under what circumstances, an investor
would forgo the opportunity for profitable speculation to join the syndicate
and share in the underwriting residual, which is occasionally negative. For
the most part, syndicate members consist of other investment banks, who
clearly have expertise in valuing new issues and for whom the prospect of
speculative profits is no doubt especially tempting. Our answer is that between
rival banks the speculation problem is reciprocal. All banks are in a position
to manage their own offerings from time to time in which they face the problem
13. The possibility for all investors to collude would change eq. (6) to
se se[ ]E max x P , 0c p xP .N
It reinforces the desirability of not allowing those investors with low cost of information ac-
quisition to take part in the issue.
14. We believe it is to investors such as these that Harold L. Stuart of Halsey, Stuart, and
Co. alludes in his testimony regarding the use of penalty bids by underwriters: “you simply had
to have a [penalty] clause in order to make this business function in putting the securities on
the market [because] there were many ways that shrewd people could beat the game and spoil
the putting of any security on the market unless you did this” (U.S. v. Morgan, 643).
15. This is in contrast to investors. Investors who have been allocated shares in the IPO buy
at the issue price. In the absence of stabilization, they sell at the market price, rather than one
set by the managing underwriter. Other investors buy and sell at the market price.
16. These practices were known as “shading” and “beating the gun,” respectively (Willis and
Bogen 1929, 420–22).
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of excess search by outsiders. Reciprocal participation by a group of invest-
ment banks in one another’s offerings is a widely recognized feature of the
syndicate system (U.S. v. Morgan, 629 and 738; Corwin and Schultz 2005).
Reciprocity establishes a tit-for-tat framework to discourage speculative wealth
transfers (Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith 1998) and increase issuer proceeds.17
What if the speculation problem is not reciprocal? Such is the case when
a smaller, less prestigious investment bank is tempted to speculate in the larger,
presumably more profitable offerings of a larger, more prestigious investment
bank, but the smaller, less profitable offerings underwritten by the less pres-
tigious bank present no temptation to the more prestigious bank. In such case,
reciprocity may no longer be necessary, and stability may suffice for the
purpose of precluding information acquisition. The more prestigious under-
writer includes in his syndicate his less prestigious counterpart, but the less
prestigious underwriter has no need to reciprocate. The less prestigious un-
derwriter forgoes the gains from speculation, despite the lack of a reciprocal
speculation problem, because his opportunity for profitable speculation likely
varies across the issues underwritten by the more prestigious underwriter,
possibly in line with the smaller, less prestigious underwriter’s familiarity with
the firm taken public and the industry and market in which it operates.18 In
contrast, stable participation affords the less prestigious underwriter a more
predictable share of the profits of the issues underwritten by the more pres-
tigious underwriter. The less prestigious underwriter need not be offered par-
ticipation in every single syndicate managed by his more prestigious coun-
terpart but in enough syndicates for him to be compensated for forgoing the
gains from speculation.19
V. Empirical Evidence
We have argued that the syndicate system encourages a collective norm of
symmetric ignorance among the investment banks that act as syndicate par-
ticipants. This suggests that syndicate participants are expected to behave
passively when it comes to information acquisition. The available evidence
17. Anand and Galetovic (2000) show that commitments of the sort can be sustained in
oligopolistic markets such as investment banking.
18. Larger, more prestigious underwriters are less likely to be so limited in their ability to
profit from speculation because of their more extensive coverage of industries and markets.
19. Underwriting syndicates exhibit some similarity to the diamond “sights” organized by De
Beers for its approved list of wholesale buyers. A sight consists of a box containing several
envelopes of diamonds. The box bears the buyer’s name and a price. De Beers selects the quality
and cut of the diamonds in each envelope according to the buyer’s prior indication of interest.
Buyers are allowed to inspect the diamonds in the box and can accept or reject it, but they
cannot negotiate its price nor can they pick and choose among the diamonds in the box. A buyer
who rejects too often risks being dropped from the exclusive list of approved buyers. Barzel
(1977) argues that sights are intended to prevent dealers from acquiring socially redundant
information about the quality of the diamonds. Buyers covet being on De Beers’s approved list,
revealing that the diamonds are systematically underpriced. See Barzel (1977) and Kenney and
Klein (1983) for further details.
2920 Journal of Business
suggests that, with the exception of comanagers, syndicate members are, in
fact, passive. Evidence in both the brief on general points and the court
opinion in U.S. v. Morgan suggests that the managing underwriter does not
solicit their input in valuing and pricing the issue.20 More recently, Corwin
and Schultz (2005) report evidence of nonmanaging syndicate participant
passivity during the book-building process. Specifically, they find that the
likelihood that positive, private information revealed in the book-building
process is incorporated into the offer price does not depend on the number
of nonmanaging syndicate participants (Corwin and Schultz 2005, table 4,
panel A).21 The results are different for negative private information, in which
case the number of nonmanagers does affect the likelihood of incorporating
the information (Corwin and Schultz 2005, table 4, panel B), but the lack of
significance of nonmanagers is reestablished when combining positive and
negative private information (Corwin and Schultz 2005, table 4, panel C).
Chen and Ritter (2000, 1120–21) and Eccles and Crane (1988, 94) note the
passivity, or at least the noninvolvement, of nonmanaging syndicate partici-
pants with respect to selling activity, and Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000,
1054) note the passivity of nonmanaging syndicate participants with respect
to stabilization operations.
The analysis in Section IV predicts that the investors invited to join the
syndicate are the investors with the lowest information acquisition costs.N n
Consistent with this prediction, Corwin and Schultz (2005, 444) find that,
with the exception of small IPOs, “having a top-ranked analyst in the issuer’s
industry significantly increases the likelihood that an underwriter is included
in a syndicate either as a co-manager or in a non-managing role.” Corwin
and Schultz further find that “underwriters are more likely to be included in
a syndicate if they are in the same state as the issuer, particularly if the book
manager is based elsewhere” (444). Having a top-ranked analyst and being
in the same state likely proxy for a low information acquisition cost.
Finally, Corwin and Schultz find strong evidence of stability and reciprocity
in syndicate participation. In their words, “the single strongest determinant
of whether an underwriter is included in a syndicate is participation in recent
syndicates led by the same book manager. Almost as important is whether
the book manager participated in recent offerings managed by the syndicate
member” (Corwin and Schultz 2005, 444).
We note that nonmanaging underwriter passivity can coexist with com-
anaging underwriter activity. Indeed, it is precisely such a pattern that is
reported by Corwin and Schultz (2005) regarding the incorporation of pos-
20. Indeed, our understanding is that, prior to the advent of book building, the managing
underwriter invited syndicate members to participate only a few days before the actual offering
(Willis and Bogen 1929, 382).
21. Using the Herfindahl index instead of the number of nonmanaging syndicate participants,
Corwin and Schultz (2005, table 4, panel A) find significance at the 10% level in one of two
formulations that use the index. But their computation of the index does not distinguish between
managing and nonmanaging syndicate participants.
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itive private information, for example. The coexistence of passivity and ac-
tivity applies not only to information preclusion and information production
but also to considerations such as the “analyst lust” hypothesis put forward
by Loughran and Ritter (2004). According to this hypothesis, issuers con-
cerned with analyst coverage may purchase coverage at the time of the IPO
by offering syndicate membership to the investment banks that employ the
desired analysts. Again, Corwin and Schultz provide supportive empirical
evidence for comanagers but not for nonmanaging syndicate participants.
VI. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Our analysis focuses narrowly on the interests of the issuer, the underwriter,
and knowledgeable investors. Although symmetric ignorance might be in their
private interest, stock prices have welfare consequences that reach much fur-
ther in the economy. If information acquisition in secondary markets is gen-
erally thought to improve resource allocation by increasing the accuracy of
prices, one might ask why the informational problems posed by IPOs are any
different than those posed by secondary market trading.
We have two responses to this question. First, the IPO market is somewhat
unique because the firm as a going concern is being priced and sold for the
first time, and information problems are therefore more acute than in secondary
markets in which information unfolds incrementally. Unlike secondary mar-
kets, where a great deal of valuation is conditional on the most recent price, in
the IPO market valuation is unconditional. This raises ex ante uncertainty and,
at the margin, implies that the potential losses from excess search are relatively
large in relation to the value of discovery information. Until an issue is properly
placed, its price is therefore likely to be a relatively poor signal for those in
the economy who might rely on it in making resource allocation decisions. The
IPO market provides an ideal setting for studying how the problem of excess
search affects institutional arrangements and, more broadly, the trade-off be-
tween discovery information and private foreknowledge.
Our second response is that even if secondary securities markets are dom-
inated by search for discovery information, the problem of excess search
persists at the margin. We therefore expect our analysis to have considerable
power in explaining evolved market institutions, not only for securities markets
but for any experience good. For example, Barzel (1982) shows that warran-
ties, brand names, sharing arrangements, and allocation limits preclude excess
search in the market for new products. Following Barzel (1977, 1982), Kenney
and Klein (1983, 2000) show that the bygone practice of block-booking first-
run films by motion picture houses precluded excess search by exhibitors and
facilitated self-enforcing distribution contracts. Coase (1937) argued early on
that the very reason for the existence of firms is to economize on the cost of
using prices, and Barzel (1982) shows in detail that organization within the
firm precludes workers from inefficiently picking and choosing between se-
quential inputs and outputs in the production process. Though the problem
2922 Journal of Business
of excess search is by no means the sole explanation for evolved institutional
arrangements, recognizing the subtle interplay between discovery information
and private foreknowledge should allow researchers to develop a more nu-
anced understanding of their observed patterns.
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